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Suhrawardi's Modal Syllogisms 
Zia Movahed
Abstract 
Suhrawardi’s logic of the Hikmat al-Ishraq is basically modal. So to 
understand his modal logic one first has to know the non-modal part upon 
which his modal logic is built. In my previous paper ‘Suhrawardi on 
Syllogisms’(3) I discussed the former in detail. The present paper is an 
exposition of his treatment of modal syllogisms. On the basis of some 
reasonable existential presuppositions and a number of controversial 
metaphysical theses, and also by confining his theory to alethic modality, 
Suhrawardi makes his modal syllogism simple in a way that is without 
precedent. 
Keywords: Suhrawardi, Logic, Modal logic, Syllogism, Hikmat al-
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Introduction 
What makes Suhrawardi’s logic markedly different from that of the 
Peripatetic logicians is his theory of modal syllogisms. Compared with 
Ibn Sina and his followers, Suhrawardi makes the subject extremely 
simple. And that is because: 
i.) He Makes modality a part of the predicate and confines his 
modality only to the alethic ones i.e., necessity and possibility. So 
he writes: 
 	
 
         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    !" #  $%& '()* (+# $, %-. /0 ((12 
) .' 5,% ( $.1, p.17(
“Since the contingency of the contingent, the 
impossibility of the impossible, and the necessity of the 
necessary are all necessary, it is better to make the modes of 
necessity, contingency, and impossibility parts of the 
predicate, so that the proposition will become necessary in 
all circumstances.” 
And he maintains that: 

  7%8 9 $"	 % :2  ;<     .1-& #  5,
).1=	 $& 
 &1, p.17(
“By ‘necessary’, we mean only that which‘is’ by virtue 
of its own essence. That which necessarily ‘is’ on condition 
of a time or a state, on the other hand, is contingent 
[possible] in itself.”  
ii.) By making modality a part of the predicate he radically changes 
the notion of the predicate in modal propositions as it was 
common among the Peripatetic logicians. 
iii.) Now by (i) the proposition ‘Every A is Mod B’; or: 
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x(AxNMod Bx), 
in which ‘Mod’ stands for ‘necessity’ or ‘possibility’ becomes: 
x(AxNMod Bx) 
The second innovation is the main reason for the simplicity of his 
modal theory. To see why, let us examine an interesting and 
controversial example in the Peripatetic tradition: 
x(FxNGx) 
x(GxNHx) 
x(FxNHx) 
This is a  first figure modal BARBARA  syllogism that Farabi and 
IbnSina argue for its validity, but among Muslim logicians perhaps it 
is Khunaji who for the first time rejects it, and depending on two 
different interpretations, he regards it either as invalid or as not known 
to be productive or sterile(2,xl-xliv.p.270-281). 
For Suhrawardi such controversy over this syllogism has no 
significance. This is because for him this syllogism is ill-formed for 
the simple reason that in it the middle term which according to (ii) is 
‘Gx’ is not repeated. So it is not a syllogism proper. For him the right 
form of the syllogism would be: 
x(FxNGx) 
x(GxNHx) 
x(FxNHx).  
But as we shall see Suhrawardi’s insistence on the recurrence of 
the middle term leads to an inconsistency in his second figure modal 
syllogisms. 
I shall come back to the disputed syllogism soon and show how its 
validity can be proven in Suhrawardi’s logic.  
But let us first examine his modal syllogisms of the first figure. 
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First figure 
As I have shown (3) Suhrawardi reduces all non-modal moods of the 
first figure to: 
x(FxNGx) 
x(GxNHx) 
x(FxNHx) 
Now by (i)-(iii)afore-mentioned, in the modal cases that single 
mood becomes: 
x(FxNModGx) 
x(ModGxNModHx) 
x(FxNModHx) 
 
‘Mod’by (ii) can be either ‘’ in the ‘ModGx’ or ‘’ and in each 
of these two cases the’Mod’ of’‘Hx’ can be ‘’ or ‘’. Given that the 
‘Mod’ of ‘H’ in the major premise and the conclusion should be the 
same we have four modal moods altogether The validity of these 
moods, all in BARBARA, is obvious. Suhrawardi gives the following 
examples: 
»
 
 ? @ 1	 !'«») @ & '
 
 !
$< 
  '(	(-« B »)
  '(	(-  @ 1	 !
$< .«(1, p.23) 
1-Necessarily every human being is a possible writer 
Necessarily every possible writer is necessarily animal 
Necessarily every human being is necessarily animal  
 
2-Necessarily every human being is a possible writer 
Necessarily every possible writer is a possible walker 
Necessarily every human being is a possible walker 
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It is worth mentioning that formally in each of the moods of this 
figure the subject of the minor premise may also be modalized and 
this would double the number of syllogisms. 
 
Suhrawardi on Aristotle’s Controversial Syllogism 
Before going to the second figure let us see how the so-called ill-
formed syllogism mentioned earlier can be converted to the 
Suhrawardian form of it and then show its validity after all. Here is the 
proof in the quantified modal logic S5 with which I assume the 
reader’s familiarity. 
x(FxNGx)      
x(GxNHx)     
x( FxNHx)   
 
1 x(FxNGx)     A
2 x(GxNHx)    A
3 x(GxNHx)    2,Ibn Sina Barcan (3)
4 (GxNHx)     3,UE 
5 GxNHx       4,ML 
6 GxNHx           5,Axiom 5 
7 x(FxNGx)       1,E
8 FxNGx               7,UE 
9 FxNHx               6,8,PL 
10 x(FxNHx)     9,UI 
11 x(FxNHx)   10, I
If we accept Suhrawardi’s embedding the premises in the necessary 
modality, which I regard it as a metaphysical thesis, and apply it to the 
controversial modal syllogism, Suhrawardi’s derivation would become 
a shortcut proof. In fact Suhrawadi goes from the first line of the 
above derivation right to the line (6). 
Here are the proofs of some other mixed syllogisms of the first 
figure found in Ibn Sina. For brevity I only mention those axioms used 
in some lines in the following proofs. It was Paul Thom who for the 
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first time interpreted Ibn-Sina’s modal syllogistic somehow in the line 
with Suhrawardi by embedding Ibn-Sina’s premises of modal 
syllogisms within a necessity modality(4): 
x(FxNGx) 
x(GxNHx) 
x( FxNHx) 
1 x(FxNGx)  
2 x(GxNHx)
3 x(GxNHx)
4 (GxNHx)  
5 GxNHx  
6 x(FxNGx)  
7 FxNGx  
8 FxNHx  
9 FxNHx 8, Axiom 4
10 x(FxNHx)  
11 x(FxNHx)  
x(FxNGx) 
x(GxNHx) 
x( FxNHx)  
1 x(FxNGx) A
2 x(GxNHx) A
3 x(FxNGx) 1,E
4 FxNGx 3,UE 
5 FxNGx 4,Axiom T 
6 x(GxNHx) 2,E
7 GxNHx 3,UE 
8 FxNHx 5,7 Barbara
9 x(FxNHx) 8,UI 
10 x(FxNHx) 9,I
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x(FxNGx) 
x(GxNHx) 
x( FxNHx)  
1 x(FxNGx) A
2 x(GxNHx) A
3 x(FxNGx) 1,E
4 FxNGx 3,UE 
5 FxNGx 4,Axiom T 
6 x(GxNHx) 2,E
7 GxNHx 3,UE 
8 FxNHx 5,7 Barbara
9 x(FxNHx) 8,UI 
10 x( FxNHx) 9,I
Second figure 
Suhrawardi’s single pattern for this figure is: 
x(FxNModGx) 
x(HxNModGx) 
x(FxNHx) 
Here ‘Mod’ may be either ‘’ in the both premises or ‘’. So we 
have only two modal syllogisms provided the subject of each premise 
is not modalized. Suhrawardi’s example is the following: 
»'
 
 @ 1	 ! «»)& @)  , ! ')
 ) .«
) .' -  @ 1	% 7 C."&1, p.23(
Necessarily every human being is a possible writer  
Necessarily every stone is not a possible (is an impossible) writer 
 
Necessarily every human being is not a possible (is an impossible) 
stone. 
12 Sophia Perennis, Spring and Summer 2012, Serial Number 21 
Or,in modern symbolism:  
x(HxNLx) 
x(SxNLx)  
x(HxNSx) 
 
Here in this syllogism we are faced with two problems. 
1- Despite Suhrawardi’s insistence that the middle term should 
remain the same in the premises (1,p.21), in this syllogism, by 
turning both negation and modality into parts of the predicate, 
the middle term of one of the premises has become the 
negation of the other. 
2- What is the justification for adding modality to the predicate of 
the conclusion? 
As to the first problem, after mentioning the example quoted above 
he says: 
 !) ')DE F(1 ? $& G ( $&  5- H-# ;<% I(,
 '  / (& '< J"# 7	8 $) )K# L)  5)- /0) ')" 
) .(& ((*1, p.23 ( 
So, in this specific mood, it is not a condition that the 
predicates [middle terms] be the same in every respect. They 
need only be the same in what comes after  the mode that is 
made part of the predicate [middle term], it being 
permissible for the two modes of the two premises to be 
different in it (i.e. this syllogism) 
So, in fact, he makes an exception to his rules for the predicates 
and consequently allows the change of the middle term in this mood. 
As to(2) he maintains that since in this mood what is possible for 
the subject of one is impossible for the subject of the other "their two 
subjects are necessarily incompatible"(1,p.23). 
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Here Suhrawardi introduces two more rules. One rule  is logical 
and concerns the changing of the middle term from one of the 
premises to the other. The other rule is a metaphysical one, allowing  
for the addition of the modality of necessity to the predicate of the 
conclusion. 
In this figure too, the subject of the two premises can in theory 
also be modalized. Suhrawardi does not mention this possibility. 
Suhrawardi’s second rule justified 
Interestingly there is a derivation of Suhrawardi’s common pattern for 
the second figure with the same modal conclusion without using his 
rule in quantified modal logic S5 which shows Suhravardi’s sound 
intuition behind his second rule for that figure. This is the rule Ibn-Sina 
also used for that figure before Suhravardi. Here is the derivation1:
x(HxNLx) 
x(SxNLx)  
x(HxNSx) 
 
1 x(FxNLx)     A
2 x(SxN~Lx)    A
3 x(SxN~Lx)    2,Ibn Sina Barcan (3)
4 (SxN~Lx)     3,UE 
5 SxN~Lx 4,ML 
6 ~~LxN~Sx 5, Contraposition 
7 LxN~Sx 6,  
8 x(FxNLx)      1,E
9 FxNLx 8,UE 
10 FxNLx 9,Axiom 5 
11 FxN~Sx 7,10,PL 
12 x(FxNSx)   11,UI 
13 x( FxNSx)  12, I
This derivation provides us with an additional support for accepting 
quantified modal logic S5 as probably the best modal logic representing 
metaphysical necessity. (9,pp. 257-273) 
 
1- I would like to thank Dr. Assadollah Fallahi for bringing this point to my attention. 
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Third figure 
Suhrawardi’s treatment of the third figure is even briefer than the first 
and the second and gives no modal example. But from what I said on 
his non modal cases (3, pp. 8-11) his single mood for this figure is: 
x (GxNModFx) 
x (GxNModHx) 
x (ModFx & ModHx) 
Obviously in this mood according to whether ‘Mod’ in each of 
the premises represents possibility or necessity, we would have four 
modal moods. In these moods too we need the following additional 
necessary existential premise for each mood to get the modality de
dicto for the conclusion: 
xGx 
So, all in all, we have the following four possible conclusions: 
x (/Fx&/Hx) 
Some of these conclusions, namely the ones that are in the 
modality of necessity, can be simplified by elimination of that 
modality. The only conclusion that cannot be simplified and that has 
no counterpart in Ibn-Sina’s tradition is: 
x(Fx&Hx) 
This ends my exposition of Suhrawardi’s modal syllogisms. I think 
that the following additional points are worth mentioning: 
1- Given the semantics of modality in terms of possible worlds 
Suhrawardi’s making modality a part of the predicate of modal 
propositions can have two readings with different truth-conditions. 
For example‘Fa’, in particular where ‘a’ is a definite description, 
can be read as ‘(Fa)’ or ‘(F)(a)’. Now if we take ‘a’ as ‘The author 
of Hamlet’, then in the first reading and at the possible world w ‘The 
author of Hamlet’ refers to whoever at that possible world has this 
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description whether Shakespeare or not. But in the second reading ‘F’ 
applies only to Shakespeare at w, if he exists in w at all. The question 
is how to read Suhrawardi’s de re modality. Now according to the 
second interpretation the proposition: 
Every man is a possible writer 
is to be symbolized as: 
x (MxN((W)(x)) 
Here x refers to an actual man to whom writing as a possible 
natural capacity applies and Suhrawardi takes this application true , 
not only as a matter of fact, but also as a matter of necessity, so: 
x(MxN((W)(x)). 
2- Suhrawardi’s rule for the second figure goes back to IbnSina. 
IbnSina maintains that in this figure the two subjects of each mood are 
essentially different, so it is not possible to predicate the major term to 
the minor. 
Ibn Sina writes: 
 (&  M-& %-1	 N  (N ?  $) .' 'JO PH ' (6. p.38(
And the truth about it [the conclusion] demands not to be 
ashamed of the truth that the conclusion is always necessary 
negation. 
Ibn-Sina by ‘not being ashamed’is referring to his disagreement 
with Aristotle’s view on this point in the Prior Analytics (7, 10-11) 
where he discusses the modal syllogisms. Ibn Sina also takes up this 
subject in more detail in his so far unpublished book on logic: Al-
Mukhtasar al-Awsat (8, Manuscript, no.2763, p.54, Nour Uthmaniyah 
Library in Istanbul).  
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Conclusion 
The theory of modal syllogisms in the Islamic logical tradition is a very 
complicated and controversial subject. But as we have seen, Suhrawardi 
gives a very simple version of the subject. He has done it by: 
1- confining it to alethic modality;  
2- turning modality and negation into parts of the predicate of 
modal propositions; 
3- reducing all moods of each figure to a single universal 
affirmative pattern; 
4- embedding all the premises of the syllogisms in the necessity 
modality; 
5- introducing for each of his second and third figure syllogisms only 
one rule for deduction and so dispensing with the rule of 
conversion and the other rules that are traditionally used for 
reducing the latter figures to the first; 
Suhrawardi’s de dicto necessity reading of all premises and de re 
necessity rule for the second figure discussed above makes his theory 
committed to essentialism. 
I would like to thank Professor Joep Lameer and Professor Paul 
Thom and Dr. Assadollah Fallahi for comments on the final version of 
this paper. 
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